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Cross v. VanDyke:1 Admitted Only Means Admitted
Tyler Stockton
I. INTRODUCTION
Five delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention
sued to block Lawrence VanDyke’s (“VanDyke”) name from appearing
on the ballot as a candidate for the Montana Supreme Court, arguing he
did not meet the minimum eligibility requirements. The Court, in a 4–3
vote, found VanDyke eligible because Article VII, Section 9(1) of the
Montana Constitution only requires one be “admitted” to the Montana
Bar and not “admitted” and on “Active Status” per the Montana Bar ByLaws.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
VanDyke was admitted to the Montana Bar in October of 2005.
From 2007 to 2012, VanDyke voluntarily chose to be on “inactive”
status with the Montana Bar. On December 8, 2012, VanDyke returned
to “active” status and filed to run as a candidate for the Montana
Supreme Court on March 10, 2014. On March 21, 2014, five members of
the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention filed suit to remove
VanDyke’s name from the ballot. The complaint alleged VanDyke did
not meet the minimum requirements for judicial officers, which required
that one be “admitted to the practice of law for five years.”2 On summary
judgment, the district court found in favor of the plaintiffs. VanDyke
immediately appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.3 On July 22, 2014,
by a vote of 4–3, the Court reversed the district court and held VanDyke
met the eligibility requirements.4
III. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Justice Baker relied on textual
construction of Article VII, Section 9(1) and a historical examination of
the 1972 Constitutional Convention’s adoption of the provision.

1

Cross v. VanDyke, 332 P.3d 215 (Mont. 2014).
The full text of the provision reads: “A citizen of the United States who
has resided in the state two years immediately before taking office is eligible to
the office of supreme court justice or district court judge if admitted to the
practice of law in Montana for at least five years prior to the date of appointment
or election.” Mont. Const. art. VII, § 9(1).
3
Cross, 332 P.3d at 215.
4
Id. at 216.
2

2014

ADMITTED ONLY MEANS ADMITTED

89

Constitutional provisions must be given their plain meaning, and every
word and clause must be given effect.5 Prior case law held that “the
qualifications for Supreme Court Justice are dictated solely by the
Constitution and covered exclusively in Article VII, Section 9.”6 Since
all members of the Montana Bar, regardless of their status, are
“admitted,” and Article VII, Section 9(1) only states one must be
“admitted,” that is the crucial requirement for eligibility. In addition, the
eligibility requirements for Attorney General specifically require
candidates have “active” practice, language noticeably absent from the
judicial qualifications.7 The Court refused to read an “active” practice
requirement into the judicial eligibility requirements because it would
make the constitutional requirements for the Attorney General surplus
language.8
The Court reinforced its conclusion with a historical argument.
Citing precedent, even if the plain meaning construction is quite clear, if
any ambiguity remains and the other possible interpretations are
plausible, the Court looks to legislative history for clarification.9 During
the Constitutional Convention, the Judiciary Committee developed two
different proposals. One required candidates be “experienced with the
law in Montana for at least five years.” The other simply required
candidates be “admitted to the practice of law for five years.” After
intense debate, the full convention adopted the current language. The
Court concluded that the convention’s decision to reject the more
stringent requirements in favor of a “more elastic and flexible” version
was compelling.10 Therefore, the Constitution only requires the candidate
be admitted to the Montana Bar for five years, not on “active” status.

5

Id. at 217, 219.
Id. at 217 (citing Reichert v. State, 278 P.3d 455, 476 (Mont. 2012)
(Justice Nelson’s opinion noted in full that “Article VII, Section
9(1) contemplates that the qualifications for these offices are dictated solely by
the Constitution.”)).
7
Id. at 219 (the full text of Article VI, Section 3(2) reads: “Any person with
the foregoing qualifications is eligible to the office of attorney general if an
attorney in good standing admitted to practice law in Montana who has engaged
in the active practice thereof for at least five years before election.”).
8
Id. (citing Friends of the Wild Swan v. Dept. of Nat. Resources &
Conserv., 127 P.3d 394 (Mont. 2005); Keene Corp. v. U.S., 508 U.S. 200, 208
(1993) (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute, but omits it in another . . ., it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”)).
9
Cross, 332 P.3d at 220 (citing Racicot v. Dist. Ct., 794 P.2d 1180 (Mont.
1990); State v. Gregori, 328 P.3d 1128 (Mont. 2014)).
10
Cross, 332 P.3d at 220–222. This version was accompanied with notes
stating that its strength was in its “its elasticity and flexibility” as well as its
“force in its clarity.” Id. at 221.
6
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IV. DISSENTING OPINION
The dissent argued that the majority’s textual reading of Article
VII, Section 9(1) lacks a proper understanding of Article VII, Section
2(3).11 Article VII, Section 2(3) gives the Supreme Court the power to
“make rules governing appellate procedure, practice and procedure for
all other courts, admission to the bar and the conduct of its members.”12
The Court exercised this power by adopting the Montana Bar By-Laws.
Therefore, the definition of “admitted to the practice of law” ought to be
drawn from the By-Laws. VanDyke was prohibited from practicing law
while he was on inactive status with the Montana Bar. Article VII,
Section 9(1) requires that VanDyke be “admitted to the practice of law”
for at least five years. Since he could not practice while on inactive
status, he is therefore ineligible to serve on the Montana Supreme Court
because he has not met the five-year requirement.13
V. ANALYSIS
This case attempts to resolve a de novo interpretation of a
constitutional provision. Using Montana’s clear guidelines for
interpreting de novo provisions, the majority properly examines the plain
language of the text, construes all sections of the document to have
meaning, and after concluding that there could be some ambiguity in the
textual construction because both interpretations are plausible, turns to
the constitutional history for clarification. The majority concluded that
one view of the history is compelling and uses it to reinforce its textual
conclusion, but that view overlooks the general ambiguity of the history
as a whole. This ambiguity could have been easily resolved by adopting
the Democracy Canon.
To begin, when interpreting the Constitution, “if possible, effect
must be given to every section and clause.”14 Interpretation ought not
11

Id. at 223 (Cotter, Sandefur, & McLean, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (citing Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2(3) (“[The Court] may make rules
governing appellate procedure, practice and procedure for all other courts,
admission to the bar and the conduct of its members. Rules of procedure shall be
subject to disapproval by the legislature in either of the two sessions following
promulgation.”)).
13
Id. at 223–224.
14
Martien v. Porter, 219 P. 817 (Mont. 1923). This rule has been in place in
Montana since 1898. Mont. Coal & Coke Co. v. Livingston, 52 P. 780, 780
(Mont. 1898) (“The principle of construction, as applied to a written
constitution, is that effect must be given, if possible, to the whole instrument and
to every section and clause.”); Kottel v. State, 60 P.3d 403, 413 (Mont. 2002);
City of Missoula v. Cox, 196 P.3d 452, 454 (Mont. 2008).
12
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“create surplus language”15 and the intent of the framers of the
Constitution is “determined from the plain language of the words
used.”16
The judicial requirements of Article VII, Section 9(1) are:
A citizen of the United States who has resided in the
state two years immediately before taking office is
eligible to the office of supreme court justice or district
court judge if admitted to the practice of law in Montana
for at least five years prior to the date of appointment or
election.17
Article VII, Section 2(3) also clearly gives the Court the authority to
make rules regarding “admission to the bar and the conduct of its
members.”18 Further, the requirements for the Attorney General note:
Any person with the foregoing qualifications is eligible
to the office of attorney general if an attorney in good
standing admitted to practice law in Montana who has
engaged in the active practice thereof for at least five
years before election.19
First, an interpretation that gives effect to each cause without
creating surplus language would find that there is no “active”
requirement for judicial officers. The language in the Attorney General
requirements is very similar to that for judicial officers, but it has several
modifiers that add significant meaning not present in the court eligibility
requirements. The Attorney General qualifications add “good standing”
and “active” to the requirements. To construe both clauses to have
meaning with no surplus language, one must conclude that there is no
“active” requirement for judicial officers.
Second, the plain language of the provisions in question force
Article VII, Section 9(1) to constrain how Article VII, Section 2(3) is
applied to the eligibility requirements of judicial officers. In Section 2(3),
15

Kottel, 60 P.3d at 413; Hawley v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conserv., 993 P.2d
677, 679–680 (Mont. 2000). Montana applies the rules of statutory construction
to constitutional construction as well. Keller v. Smith, 553 P.2d 1002, 1006
(Mont. 1976); Willems v. State, 325 P.3d 1204, 1208 (Mont. 2014) (“When
resolving disputes of constitutional construction, we apply the rules of statutory
construction and give a broad and liberal interpretation to the Constitution.”).
16
Willems, 325 P.3d at 1208; See also In re Pet. of McCabe, 544 P.2d 825,
828 (Mont. 1975); Cashman v. Vickers, 233 P.897, 899 (Mont. 1924).
17
Mont. Const. art. VII, § 9(1).
18
Id. at art. VII, § 2(3).
19
Id. at art. VI, § 3(2).
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the Court is given the authority only over “admission” and “conduct” of
the Montana Bar.20 Section 9(1) requires one be “admitted to the practice
of law.” “Admission” and “admitted” are both derived from “admit.” The
Court has consistently found that “[a]ll of the provisions of the
Constitution bearing upon the same subject matter are to receive
appropriate attention and be construed together.”21 Therefore, similar
words must be construed similarly. The plain meaning of “admit” is to
“allow to join a organization” or “allow to share in a privilege.”22 Since
Article VII, Section 9(1) only requires “admission,” the Court’s authority
over “admission” is all that is implicated when reconciling the
requirements. The Court has exercised this authority by prescribing how
one is “admitted” to the Montana Bar: by passing the Montana Bar and
the required character and fitness examinations. The majority, therefore,
correctly concludes the text clearly indicates no “active” requirement.
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that there is potentially
some ambiguity in its interpretation because the appellee’s construction
is plausible.23 As such, the majority then examines the 1972 Montana
Constitutional Convention notes for clarification. Here, the majority
concludes that the convention’s rejection of the more stringent proposal
for the judiciary language is compelling enough to support their textual
reading.24 This, however, does not fully address the events of the
constitutional convention.
Article VII’s enactment history reflects a somewhat mixed
constitutional intent that could be construed to require some sort of
“active” legal practice in Montana or not. Depending on the emphasis
given to the source, three different arguments can be made regarding the
meaning of Article VII, Section 9(1). Two resolve in favor of an “active”
requirement and one does not.
First, the only full convention commentary regarding Article VII,
Section 9(1)’s adoption implies “active” practice in Montana. Delegate
Berg commented during the floor debate:
It was the belief of the committee . . . that it takes
experience in the courtroom, it takes experience in the
actual practice in Montana in order to understand the
procedures that we use, and that it would be harmful to
the carrying out of justice in our courts if we had people

20

Id. at art. VII, § 2(3).
Jones v. Judge, 577 P.2d 846, 849 (Mont. 1978); Hilger v. Moore, 182 P.
477 (Mont. 1919).
22
The New Oxford American Dictionary 21 (Erin McKean ed., Oxford U.
Press 2005).
23
Cross, 332 P.3d at 220.
24
Id. at 222.
21
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on the bench who were not intimately familiar not only
with Montana substantive law, but more especially with
procedural law, and we felt very strongly that one of the
most significant qualifications would be actual trial
practice in court.25
Using Delegate Berg’s comments as a guide to read the text of the
provision, the five year requirement becomes the practical outworking of
the goal: intimate familiarity with Montana law developed by actual legal
practice. If one can only practice law in Montana while on an “active”
status with the Montana Bar, then that goal is only met in that manner.
Second, the official Voter Guide distributed to all Montanans
prior to the ratification of the constitution implies there is an “active”
practice requirement.26 Some have argued that since Montana voters
were the ones who actually placed the 1972 Constitution into law, not the
delegates to the convention, the information they used to decide is what
ought to be referenced for interpretation.27 Regarding Article VII,
Section 9(1), the Voter Guide specifically notes:
Revises 1889 constitution by making residency
requirements for candidates for district court judgeship
the same as for supreme court and deleting age
requirements. Requirement for five years of law practice
new.28
The Voter Guide’s statement, “Requirement for five years of law
practice new,” provides the intent for “admitted to the practice of law.”
“Law practice,” therefore, is the interpretation of “admitted.” This would
imply that those practicing law are those allowed do so per the Montana
Bar. The Court has authority over the “conduct” of the Bar and enacted
the rules for practice.29 These rules would be the appropriate test for
determining eligibility and, according to them, one must be on “active”
status.
Finally, the procedural history of Article VII, Section 9(1),
which the majority finds conclusive, concludes that there is no
requirement for “active” practice. During the Convention, the Judiciary
25

1971–1972 Montana Constitutional Convention Verbatim Transcript vol.
V, 1119–1120 (1981) (hereinafter Montana Constitutional Convention).
26
Proposed 1972 Constitution for the State of Montana: Official Text with
Explanation 13 (1972) (hereinafter Voter Guide).
27
Fritz Snyder, The Right to Know and the Right to Participate in Montana,
66 Mont. L. Rev. 297, 300–301 (2005); Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The
Montana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 15 (Greenwood Press 2001).
28
Voter Guide, supra n. 26, at 13.
29
Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2(3).
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Committee submitted two proposals for the language of Article VII.30
The majority proposal passed out of committee on a five-to-four vote,
but the minority proposal was the version actually enacted in the
constitution.31 The majority proposal had much more specific eligibility
requirements for judicial officers.32 It required they be “admitted to
practice law in Montana and experienced with the law in Montana for at
least five years immediately prior to filing for or being appointed to the
position of justice.”33 The majority proposal was rejected for the more
elastic and flexible minority proposal.34 This clear rejection of the very
specific requirements demonstrates intent to not have those specific
requirements. As such, if one weighs the procedural history as providing
the overall intent of the convention, there is no “active” practice
requirement in Article VII, Section 9(1).
Depending on the weight given to the source of intent, the
outcome varies. The majority finds one of the readings compelling and
uses it to enforce its very strong textual argument. There is, however, no
fully clean answer from the history. At minimum, this injects some
ambiguity to the historical argument, which could have been resolved
with the Democracy Canon.
VI. THE DEMOCRACY CANON: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
The court reached a sound textual construction, but admitted
there could be some ambiguity and turned to Article VII’s rancorous
history for clarification. As noted above, there is not much historical
clarity: both sides have valid interpretations. As briefed by VanDyke, the
Democracy Canon would have been an excellent resolution to this
ambiguity.35 The Democracy Canon, as articulated by Richard Hasen, is
an interpretative canon that has been used in state courts since 1885 to
resolve questions of either voter or candidate eligibility issues during an
election.36 Although never adopted in Montana, use of the Democracy
Canon has been widespread throughout the nation.37 Since Cross v.
30

Montana Constitutional Convention, supra n. 25, at vol. I, 537–539.
Id. at vol. I, 537–539.
32
Id. at vol. I, 495.
33
Id.
34
Id. at vol. I, 514 (“This minority proposed Judicial Article is truly a viable
cornerstone for the establishment and operation of the courts of Montana. Its
elasticity and flexibility are its strength; its clarity lends it force.”).
35
The Democracy Canon was fully briefed by VanDyke in this case and
presented a ripe opportunity for the Court to adopt the one aspect of the canon.
36
Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 69, 76–77
(2009).
37
Id. Notably, Hasen cites only one Montana case: Stackpole v. Hallahan,
40 P. 80 (Mont. 1895). In Stackpole, a political party made a technical error in
31
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VanDyke involves only a candidate eligibility question, analysis of the
Democracy Canon and its applicability will be limited to that area.
The canon has typically been used when election statutes are
ambiguous.38 The general principle is that “[a]ll statutes tending to limit
the citizen in his exercise of the right of suffrage should be liberally
construed in his favor.”39 The purpose of the canon is: (1) to expand
opportunities for registered voters to vote and have their votes counted
(voter access and enfranchisement); and, to a lesser extent, (2) to
promote competitive elections by including more candidates or parties on
the ballot (electoral competitiveness).40 “Liberal construction of election
laws serves ‘to allow the greatest scope for public participation in the
electoral process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to allow parties
to put their candidates on the ballot, and most importantly to allow voters
a choice on Election Day.’”41
The 2008 Alaska case of Municipality of Anchorage v. Mjos42 is
a good example of the Democracy Canon’s application to candidate
eligibility issues. Municipal statutes only allowed three consecutive
terms on the Anchorage Assembly. Dick Traini was elected mid-term as
an assemblyman, serving the last year of a full, three-year cycle and then
was elected to two more full terms. Traini then declared his candidacy to
run for another term. A local doctor filed for injunctive relief to declare
that Traini’s “partial-term” was considered a term for counting the
number of consecutive terms he could serve and therefore was ineligible
to run again. The trial court found the “partial-term” counted as a term

appointment of a replacement nomination. The Court found that the error was
not substantial and ruled the nomination valid. Id. Further examination of
Montana cases demonstrates no specific adoption of the Democracy Canon.
Some courts have found the Democracy Canon to be a “rule of thumb” and
others have required their state legislatures to clearly intend to disregard the
canon to remove its use. Id. at 88.
38
Id. at 87–88.
39
Id. at 76 (citing Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett, 64 Tex. 500, 509 (1885)).
40
Id. at 84.
41
Id. at 77 (citing Catania v. Haberle, 588 A.2d 374, 379 (N.J. 1991)).
Some have criticized the use of substantive canons because they “load the dice”
towards a particular outcome. However, Hasen defends the use of the
Democracy Canon on several grounds. First, it enforces an under enforced
constitutional right. Enforcing the right to vote under equal rights protections
can be difficult and unwieldy, but the Democracy Canon serves in that stead by
enforcing statutory provisions in favor of voting rights. Second, the Democracy
Canon serves as a preference-eliciting mechanism for the legislature.
Legislatures will respond if they don’t like it and not respond if they approve.
Finally, it serves as a guiding principle that creates stability when election
supervisors are partisan officials. Id. at 77–105.
42
Municipality of Anchorage v. Mjos, 179 P.3d 941 (Alaska 2008).
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and that he was ineligible to run. The case was appealed to the Alaska
Supreme Court,43 where the court concluded:
In our view there is a presumption in favor of candidate
eligibility. In cases where there is a statutory ambiguity
as to whether or not a candidate is eligible to run for
office, the statute should be construed in favor of
eligibility, so long as it may be reasonably so read.44
The court reasoned that both parties’ views of the statute were reasonable
interpretations and therefore, since the statute was ambiguous, it ought to
be construed to allow eligibility.45
Applied to the instant case, the Democracy Canon would clearly
find VanDyke eligible to run. Article VII, Section 9(1) could be
considered ambiguous for several reasons: (1) a lower court concluded
one way and the Supreme Court another way on the text and history; and
(2) the mixed constitutional history. Per the Democracy Canon,
ambiguous statutes are construed in favor of eligibility and, like Mjos,
VanDyke would be allowed to run.
The Democracy Canon would benefit Montanans in several
ways. First, it would decrease the negative effect of lawsuits over
candidate eligibility. The Secretary of State screens to determine if a
candidate is eligible to run.46 VanDyke began to campaign after receiving
the Secretary of State’s certification, only be to be stopped by litigation.
The question surrounding his candidacy was legitimate, but it also cost a
candidate, in a time sensitive race, months of campaign time and press
regarding his possible ineligibility while the issue was litigated. The
courts moved as fast as possible, indeed incredibly fast, but the litigation
surely had a negative effect on his campaign. The Democracy Canon
would have minimized the interference.
Second, the Democracy Canon would serve to remove some
partisan election fights from judiciary. Elections have always been
cantankerous, but the judiciary has become increasingly involved in
recent years. The 2000 Presidential election is a perfect example.
Candidates and advocates rush to the courts for injunctions,
invalidations, and other legal remedies. Sometimes the resulting
decisions change the outcome of an election. The instant case marks the
Montana judiciary’s entry into candidate eligibility questions. Whether
right or wrong, these injections seem to cast a pall over the elections
themselves. Those who lose in court and their supporters always believe
43

Id. at 942.
Id. at 943.
45
Id.
46
Mont. Code Ann. § 31–1–201 (2013).
44
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the court was partisan and politicized. This is no less true for the instant
case. The plaintiffs are supporters of VanDyke’s opponent, Justice Mike
Wheat, and VanDyke’s removal would remove Justice Wheat’s only
challenger. Regardless of the outcome, one side would have viewed the
court as partisan.
Implementation of the Democracy Canon, with a hefty
explanation of its purpose and reasoning, could have resolved the current
issue in a manner that favors electoral competition and would have set
the stage for full adoption of the Democracy Canon in Montana. Such a
decision would have helped reduce future judicial involvement in
elections. Under such precedent, candidates and advocates would realize
the Montana Supreme Court will construe ambiguous texts in favor of
the candidate, the voter, and the ballot and it would keep elections where
they belong: in the hands of the electorate.

